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Productivity and the pandemic: short-term disruptions and long-term implicationsAbstract: This paper analyses quarterly estimates of productivity growth at industry level for three advanced economies, France, the UK and the US, for 2020. We use detailed industry-level data to distinguish reallocations of working hours between industries from pure within-industry productivity gains or losses. We find that all three countries showed positive growth rates of aggregate output per hour in 2020 over 2019. However, after removing the effects from the reallocation of hours between low and high productivity industries, only the US still performed positively in terms of within-industry productivity growth. In contrast, the two European economies showed negative within-industry productivity growth rates in 2020. While above-average digital-intensive industries outperformed below-average ones in both France and the UK, the US showed higher productivity growth in both groups compared to the European countries. Industries with medium-intensive levels of shares of employees working from home prior to the pandemic made larger productivity gains in 2020 than industries with the highest pre-pandemic work-from-home shares. Overall, after taking into account the productivity collapse in the hospitality and culture sector during 2020, productivity growth shows no clear deviation from the slowing pre-pandemic productivity trend. Future trends in productivity growth will depend on whether the favourable productivity gains (or smaller losses) in industries with above-average digital intensity will outweigh negative effects from the pandemic, in particular scarring effects on labour markets and business dynamics.
We See Data Everywhere Except in the Productivity StatisticsThis paper uses Labor Force Survey data for European countries to estimate national investment in data assets, where the asset boundary is extended beyond that for software and databases as currently defined in the System of National Accounts. We find that: (a) in 2011–2018, 1.4 percent of EU‐28 employment was engaged in the formation of (software and) data assets, with a mean growth rate of 5 percent per annum; (b) on average in 2011–2016, expanding the asset boundary raises the level of own‐account GFCF in software and databases in the EU‐16 by 61 percent, and mean growth in real investment in own‐account software and data assets to 6.9 percent pa, compared to 2.7 percent pa in national accounts; (c) in 2011–2016, expansion of the asset boundary raises labor productivity growth in the EU‐13 from 0.79 percent to 0.83 percent pa, and the contribution of software and data capital deepening over three‐fold, from 0.03 percent to 0.10 percent pa.