Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorFrancis, Suzanne*
dc.contributor.authorOnapajo, Hakeem*
dc.contributor.authorUzodike, Ufo*
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-23T10:36:15Z
dc.date.available2018-03-23T10:36:15Z
dc.date.issued2015-03
dc.identifier.citationOnapajo, H., Francis, S., & Okeke-Uzodike, U. (2015). Oil Corrupts Elections: The Political Economy of Vote-­Buying in Nigeria. African Studies Quarterly, 15(2), 1-21.en
dc.identifier.issn2152-2448
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10034/621013
dc.description.abstractThe extant perspectives on vote-buying have produced three central arguments around its causes, which are the factors of poverty, the electoral/voting system, and the nature of politics in the state. Going beyond these perspectives, this study presents the argument that vote-buying can also be explained by considering the nature of the political economy of a state, especially when the state is oil-‑dependent. The Nigerian case study demonstrates this argument. We employ the “oil-impedes-democracy” framework, which is a strand of the resource curse theory, to argue that the incidence of vote‑buying in Nigeria’s contemporary elections is prevalent because of the oil wealth associated with politics and elections in the state. This is because abundant oil wealth intensifies elite competition, which explains the use of all strategies to win elections including vote-buying. This is also facilitated by the fact that the political elite, especially the incumbent, have adequate access to oil wealth and spend it to “buy” elections and hold on to power. Voters, on their part, also prefer to sell their votes during elections to have a share of the “national cake” given their perception of the wealth associated with politics in Nigeria and the poor service delivery by politicians after assuming state offices.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity of Floridaen
dc.relation.urlhttps://asq.africa.ufl.edu/onapajo-francis-okekeuzodike_march15/en
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en
dc.subjectPolitical economyen
dc.subjectOilen
dc.subjectElectionsen
dc.subjectNigeriaen
dc.subjectAfricaen
dc.titleOil Corrupts Elections: The Political Economy of Vote-Buying in Nigeriaen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Chester; University of KwaZulu-Natalen
dc.identifier.journalAfrican Studies Quarterlyen
dc.internal.reviewer-noteContacted author re: version - need final published version 22/03/18 SMen
dc.date.accepted2015-01-01
or.grant.openaccessYesen
rioxxterms.funderUnfundeden
rioxxterms.identifier.projectUnfundeden
rioxxterms.versionAMen
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2015-03-31
html.description.abstractThe extant perspectives on vote-buying have produced three central arguments around its causes, which are the factors of poverty, the electoral/voting system, and the nature of politics in the state. Going beyond these perspectives, this study presents the argument that vote-buying can also be explained by considering the nature of the political economy of a state, especially when the state is oil-‑dependent. The Nigerian case study demonstrates this argument. We employ the “oil-impedes-democracy” framework, which is a strand of the resource curse theory, to argue that the incidence of vote‑buying in Nigeria’s contemporary elections is prevalent because of the oil wealth associated with politics and elections in the state. This is because abundant oil wealth intensifies elite competition, which explains the use of all strategies to win elections including vote-buying. This is also facilitated by the fact that the political elite, especially the incumbent, have adequate access to oil wealth and spend it to “buy” elections and hold on to power. Voters, on their part, also prefer to sell their votes during elections to have a share of the “national cake” given their perception of the wealth associated with politics in Nigeria and the poor service delivery by politicians after assuming state offices.


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
African Studies Quarterly
Size:
2.259Mb
Format:
PDF
Request:
Journal Article

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/