Forget ‘Moral Panics’

Horsley, Mark

dc.contributor.author	Horsley, Mark	*
dc.date.accessioned	2018-02-27T17:42:27Z
dc.date.available	2018-02-27T17:42:27Z
dc.date.issued	2017-08-13
dc.identifier.citation	Horsley, M. (2017). Forget ‘Moral Panics’. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology, 9(2), 84-98.	en
dc.identifier.issn	2166-8094
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10034/620884
dc.description	This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of a published work that appeared in final form in Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology. To access the final edited and published work see http://jtpcrim.org/.	en
dc.description.abstract	In the spirit of Jean Baudrillard’s Forget Foucault this article offers a step-by-step critique of the ‘moral panic’ concept. It begins with a short review of Cohen’s original thesis and its gradual evolution before addressing its remarkable popularity and its ascent to the stature of a domain assumption. The rest of the article uses and extends the existing critique of moral panic theory before arriving at the conclusion that, rather than undergo another period of adaptation, the entire conceptual repertoire of ‘moral panics’ should be ditched to make way for much-needed innovation.
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	David Polizzi	en
dc.relation.url	http://jtpcrim.org/	en
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	en
dc.subject	Moral panic	en
dc.subject	Objectless Anxiety	en
dc.subject	Harm	en
dc.subject	Realism	en
dc.subject	Social Constructionism	en
dc.title	Forget ‘Moral Panics’	en
dc.type	Article	en
dc.contributor.department	Teeside University	en
dc.identifier.journal	Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology	en
dc.date.accepted	2017-08-01
or.grant.openaccess	Yes	en
rioxxterms.funder	Unfunded	en
rioxxterms.identifier.project	Unfunded	en
rioxxterms.version	AM	en
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate	2018-03-27
html.description.abstract	In the spirit of Jean Baudrillard’s Forget Foucault this article offers a step-by-step critique of the ‘moral panic’ concept. It begins with a short review of Cohen’s original thesis and its gradual evolution before addressing its remarkable popularity and its ascent to the stature of a domain assumption. The rest of the article uses and extends the existing critique of moral panic theory before arriving at the conclusion that, rather than undergo another period of adaptation, the entire conceptual repertoire of ‘moral panics’ should be ditched to make way for much-needed innovation.