‘Soldiering by consent’ and military-civil relations: Military transition into the public space of policing.

Emma Murray
School of Law, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK
E.T.Murray@ljmu.ac.uk

Paul Taylor
Department of Social and Political Science, University of Chester, Chester, UK
paul.taylor@chester.ac.uk
Abstract

Growth in the Armed Forces undertaking public policing is occurring in the United Kingdom and elsewhere and as such a complex security landscape emerges, both practically and conceptually. The aim here is to pose questions of the manifest and latent issues in the assemblage of multiple actors in public policing. It asks to reader to consider the implications of military actors transitioning from defence duties ordinarily associated with military work, to policing activities in public spaces. Taking the London 2012 Olympic Games as our point of reference, this article argues that to understand military presence, their role must be considered in the broader context of military and policing functions, the ‘war on terror’, accountability, and future priorities for public policing. We must be careful not to assign the presence of the military into pre-existing understandings of how mega-events should be secured – the military patrolling the streets of London represents more. Instead, as their presence comes to be legitimate in certain geopolitical contexts, critical questions must be asked especially as public and private arrangements are continually reworked in the domestic fight against terrorism.

Keywords: terrorism, mega events, policing, military, security
Introduction

This paper questioning the future of evolving security landscapes and military assistance for domestic security. It comes at a time in recent British history where the military are more readily seen guarding sites or patrolling streets of the mainland United Kingdom. Operation Temperer, a British government plan to deploy troops to support police officers, has been implemented twice in 2017, first following an explosion at a music concert in Manchester in May, and second in response to an improvised explosive device detonating on a commuter train in London in September. Between 23rd and 27th May 2017 armed troops were seen alongside armed police at a range of sites, such as parliament buildings and entrances. In September 2017, troops were sent to replace armed police at sites such as nuclear establishments to release armed Civil Nuclear Constabulary police officers, therefore making them available for public policing roles.

These instances are unique, but more frequently occurring. Such a deployment of the armed military in May 2017 had not been seen since the then Prime Minister Tony Blair authorised military deployment to Heathrow airport, London, in 2003 following intelligence of an imminent terror threat. A visible armed military presence is not uncommon in neighbouring European countries. Indeed, following terror attacks in the Netherlands, German and France, the military guarding and patrolling key sites and venues is not uncommon, although however have been the target of knife attacks perhaps for reasons of them representing the epitome of securitisation. The United Kingdom has not adopted a similar security regime, rather deploying and repealing military assistance momentarily. However, what we do see, and can potentially forecast, is a more frequent and potentially extended use of the military in public spaces despite currently measured decisions over their use. As demands for public security greaten, politicians may see military assistance to the police as an increasingly appealing option on a more routine basis. What we see now as unique events, could, depending on decisions taken within a given prevailing security discourse, become a more commonly witnessed resource intervention. Moreover, the role and function of the military in these roles potentially could be more diverse.

The purpose of this article is to raise some cautionary notes on the future of military-police assemblages that combine under the auspices of domestic security. Central to what is outlined here is that use, diversification, and/or intensity in the deployment of military personnel alongside the public police brings about a different kind of soldiering. To contextualise this issue, this article positions the example of unarmed military assistance at the London Olympic Games in 2012. This is a unique example of what may or may not be consigned to history, however the general rhetoric of ‘success’ that surrounded it may well mean that in a future where heavier demands are placed on the public police, a reality of security landscapes that incorporate the military further is imaginable.
‘Policing’ the London 2012 Olympic Games

The 2012 London Olympic Games occupies a particular space in society’s consciousness of global events. In itself the Olympic Games illustrates a sporting mega-event, it does so against a backdrop of other historical events. The London Olympic Games represents a spectacle of sport, but it is more than this. It is a promotion of peace through sport (Sugden, 2012) but at the same time signifies the convergence of police-military operations to securitise the environment from ‘war’ (Coaffee, 2015; MacDonald and Hunter, 2013). The London Olympics was underpinned by a series of geo-political and socio-political issues, namely the legacy of previous violent attacks on Olympic Games (for example, Munich and Atlanta) (see, Boyle and Haggaerty, 2012; Sugden, 2012), over a decade of rhetorical, policy and operational focus on the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’ and, widespread social unrest less than twelve months earlier (UK summer riots of 2011).

Yet, despite the context outlined above, the London Olympic Games of 2012 was widely regarded as a competent and successful security operation; at the forefront of that success, the military being credited for their assistive role to the police and a problematic private security provider (G4S) with some 18,200 troops deployed. While there were concerns for some of the security arrangements that were militaristic in nature (for example, the docking of a naval warship on the banks of the River Thames, see Evans, 2012a), an overwhelming public support for military involvement prevailed. The London Olympics in 2012, for a series of reasons, seemingly was an example of military intervention that did not generate significant unease about engaging the military in quasi-policing roles. In fact, as soldiers patrolled the streets of London, onlookers witnessed a fundamental change in the relationship between the military and public police roles. What is more, this military presence accrued public support, with many reporting their ease and almost celebration of being searched by soldiers:

The public love them, their efficiency, friendly nature and some of the women coming into the Park often admit there is that man-in-uniform factor. “I was very happy to see the soldiers”, says Liz Gluckman, arriving with her family from Cobham. “They were very friendly and smiling”. “And they were efficient”, adds her husband Ray, with some speed. “We came to a test event here last year and it was very slow. But today we just went through in one minute, if that” (BBC News, 2012).

A public acceptance of an unarmed military policing London veiled some pressing issues and presents an opportunity to ask important questions – something which we aim to illuminate upon here. This article is the product of questions, rather than answers that has been troubling us for some time - in particular, since the London Olympics 2012. Our questioning was brought into sharp focus after the attacks in Paris in November 2015, and more recent deployments in the UK in 2017, and as a result, we offer them here. We, as many others have noted, contend that the
Securitisation of the Olympic Games represented a sophisticated network of counter-terrorism technologies, the deployment of multidisciplinary personnel and complexities of governance and accountability, post- 9/11. These sophisticated technologies have been the focus of academics for some time and can be found far beyond scholarship that takes the London Games or recent events as their focus.

There is much to learn from scholarship which has aimed its focus on the distinctions between the police and the military as there also is from a more recent academic interest in the blurring of policing roles and responsibilities (Ryan 2001; Loader and Percy, 2012; Degenhardt, 2013, 2016). In McCulloch’s (2016) analysis, an examination of roles indicates a trajectory of a weaponisation of the police. The constabularisation of the military has also been a feature of intellectual debate (Murray, 2015). However, while these are valuable insights, the London Olympic Games of 2012 introduced more than a blurring in security provision. For those in operational roles as well as scholarly onlookers’ challenges are evident, precisely ‘how an unarmed military can be understood conceptually and practically?’

To address such a question, it is necessary to first situate the matter in the background of what is already known of the context in which securitisation takes place within. Secondly, we offer insights into the multifaceted, multi-disciplinary enterprise of policing. Here we discuss the blurring of customary and institutional boundaries and the divergence from traditional practices. The policing operations of the London Olympic Games of 2012 very much challenge the history of both institutions. Thirdly, we bring together our discussions and concerns in articulating some of the potential consequences of the deployment of the military in policing roles.

Given that official oratory branded the London Olympic of 2012 a major success, how may such policing practices displayed in this event become routine or be replicated more widely? Such questions act as an important point of reflection for operations strategists in a practical sense, but also for the scholarly field which to date appears to mostly ignore such a phenomenon.

**Disentangling metaphors**

The events of September 11th 2001 radically redefined the global security landscape and its scholarship, both in how we understand terrorism and how we understand counter-terrorism (see, Houlihan and Giulianiotti, 2012). The debates, between and within disciplines have since been sprightly. However, there is a consensus that 9/11 represents, symbolically or otherwise, a watershed moment for understandings of security. While scholars had suggested for some time that the roles of the police and the role of the military were perhaps not as easy to distinguish as they had been traditionally, questions such as; ‘what is the role of the police?’ and ‘what is the role of the military?’ have become much more urgent to understand in the face of global insecurity.
To make sense of the complex picture, we argue that this blurring of policing form and function can be understood across four categories. These are: language and discourse, space, functions and delivery. Inspired by Weiss (2011, p. 402) and his invitation to those concerned with the blurring of police and military, to add to a ‘broad and lively’ debate by considering ‘definitional differences between the two forces and in their working methods, the legal framework of their functioning, and on the role of services between them’, the first task of this here is to consider an unarmed Armed Forces and the necessity of further reflection. The broad and lively debate that Weiss (2011) is referring to aims to capture how internal and external security is continually reworked as globalising processes and counter-terror strategies advance. Conventional narratives that assume a simple binary distinction between us/them or good/bad become more problematic. All relations, in fact, enter into what Agamben (1998) termed a ‘zone of indistinction’, which poses a fundamental challenge for legal frameworks. As counter-terror is now synonymous with many political ambitions, strategies have developed to merge military provision with police provision and practices of war with law enforcement. The implications, as Ryan (2013) explains, are that conventional limits concerning roles and functions are turned into strategic linkages and assemblages.

To begin the language and discourse that now permeates counter-terror strategies both domestically and internationally encourages the use of ‘war’ and ‘justice’ interchangeably. It is well documented that one cannot escape the war metaphor in criminological discourse (Garland, 1996; Ruggiero, 2005). The ‘war on terror’ is just one example of how policing functions are spoken of regarding ‘war’. What is perhaps not so well documented in criminology is that warfare relies more and more frequently upon metaphors of criminal justice (Degenhardt, 2010; Murray, 2015). This is realised through a language that situates and perceives insurgents not as actors of war but rather as criminals. This tendency has, in fact, been slowly maturing for some time. Earlier examples can be found, for instance, in a language constructed around the need to ‘punish’ or react to illegal behaviours in both the first Gulf war, Kosovo (Degenhardt, 2010) and in Northern Ireland (Murray, 2015). It is perhaps now more apparent however in public and political rhetoric, exemplified with notions such as to ‘bring terrorists to justice’ and ‘eliminate the threat that they pose’ (Blair, 2001). In this altered security terrain, the management of the risks of violence cannot be divorced from asking where ‘war’ takes place, which is perhaps why the military presence to counter terror threats within domestic space was largely unquestioned.

The category of space refers to state borders. What followed post 9/11, as Bauman (2002: 87) notes, was the ‘symbolic end to the era of space’, and importantly for policing studies, this meant the police assuming new counter-terror roles, as the front line of the war on terror was everywhere. Whilst borders have always been porous (Bauman, 2002), the notion of territory was reconfigured post 9/11, epistemologies of ‘crime’ and ‘war’ that are predicated upon linear territorial modelling have lost much
credibility as the Western world wages a ‘war on terror’ as global counter-terror strategies mean that domestic and international responses share the same political and juridical spaces. With the collapse in spatial awareness between modernist constructs of inside and outside, risks no longer have points of origin. The conception of war, as such, is invariably transformed as fundamental questions of spatial integrity are undermined (Holmquist, 2012). This does not mean to say that questions of spatial integrity are no longer necessary or of issue. On the contrary, in our radically interconnected world, all problems are internal problems (Bauman 2002). Given the wider political significance, upon this altered terrain the reach of criminal justice policy is interrogated as a problem of policing and an attempt to protect the domestic through international designs (Kraska, 2007; Krasman, 2007; Loader and Percy, 2012).

To understand the functional blurring in security provisions is to speak to the militarisation of the public police and the constabularisation of the military. Easton and Moelkers (2007) have already pointed to the challenges that both security services will face as they take on one another’s characters. Scholars who focus on the ‘militarisation’ of the police analyse how the public police rely more heavily upon military equipment and special units inspired by military designs (Kraska, 2007; Krasman, 2007; Loader and Percy 2012; Murray, 2015; Ryan, 2013). Arguments have been advanced, in particular in the context of counter-terrorism policing, of the consequences (unintended or otherwise) of shifts in the public police utilising military tactics and hardware. The idea that terrorism is conceived of as a new form of violence threatening democracies has often been a basis to develop the claim that preparedness requires revision to the public policing methodologies. Military involvement in police training and collaborative activities between the public police and the military are emblematic of a professional convergence commonly occurring in countries such as the United States (see, Campbell and Campbell, 2016).

We see evidence, and there are some excellent scholarly analyses on a militarisation of public policing, whereby the traditional public police unit take on the form and function of the military on the nation’s streets (see, Rantatalo, 2012). Similarly, some jurisdictions outside the UK have sought to build firmer and stronger links between the public police and military units to capacity-build protective mechanisms (see Kirby, Graham and Green, 2013). Variants of these approaches exist also, and so arguably who exactly undertakes a domestic policing role continues on a trajectory of opaqueness. One such example is The European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR); a European Union enterprise with signatories of a Treaty from France, Portugal, Spain, Poland, The Netherlands, Romania and Italy. Described as a multinational police force, the EUROGENDFOR can be entitled to executive police powers (for example being armed) and can be deployed alongside the military where local police forces are deemed ineffective amidst high levels of insecurity and/or criminality. Moreover, the EUROGENDFOR may act under a civilian or a military chain of command. Benefits of such an
approach to shore up resilience have apparently been accepted in some quarters. However, this further evidence of policing pluralism remains controversial, not least in their force capability, their deployment rationale, accountability, transparency and antithetical positioning to democratic policing (Statewatch, 2006).

Military assistance to the public police has been a prominent narrative of contemporary public order policing and counter-terrorism strategies. An increase in ‘threat’ and concern over the availability of traditional police resourcing has prompted renewed political and policy attention over the preparedness of UK resources to preserve public safety and security. Public policing continues to exist in an austere climate, and concerns have been levied over the number of police officers nationally. Law and order agendas (and who is tasked with their enforcement) have accrued political attention in the wake of civil disturbances such as the summer 2011 riots across some UK towns and cities. In this example, Prime Minister of the Coalition government of the time, David Cameron, called for a development of policing contingencies to ‘fight back’ against civil unrest. Articulated along the rhetorical lines of ‘Broken Britain’, Cameron pledged to address the problem of criminality through enhanced civil defence strategies, namely drawing upon the military to undertake policing roles to ‘free-up’ the police to continue with other police duties.

The UK’s summer 2011 riots (see Briggs, 2012), and the political oratory which took place at the time and after had a lasting effect on the nomenclature of policing. London Mayor of the time, Boris Johnson agreed to the purchase of water canon (not seen in deployment since Northern Ireland) which was met with criticism on the basis of it being an over exuberance in the availability of (indiscriminate) force and therefore a direct challenge to principles of policing by consent and a use of force proportionate with the threat presented. These purchases paralleled broader concerns of increased weaponisation of the public police such as ‘sound cannons’, Taser, batten rounds, irritant projectiles and ‘skunk oil’. Moreover, official vocabulary has been shaped with militaristic influence. Policing at times of civil unrest has been described by authorities and the media as a ‘conflict zone’, where those tasked with policing are ‘combatting’ ‘insurgency’. The war narratives presented serve to obscure the differentiation between domestic and external threat, and counsel the audience in such a way that domination and exacting force are the principal ways to deal with the perceived threat. Self-referential statements propagated that refer to a ‘war on terror’, a ‘war on lawlessness’ and an increasing insecurity may well serve as an impetus for greater military involvement in policing. Authorising (by governments and consented to by some quarters of society) enhanced capabilities of force, then, shape public police-military assemblages without question.

The constabularisation of the military is seen to have occurred in two distinct ways: the first is to allow them to be involved in internal security provisions (Easton and Moelkers, 2007) such as airport security (Brooks, 2005) and border control (Dover, 2008). Weiss (2011) explains that the military is ushered into these arrangements
when the public police do not have the capabilities. The second way that the military is considered to have been constabularised is when they are deployed to conflict or post-conflict zones to perform ‘peacekeeping’ tasks such as those carried out by the police (Banton, 2005). In these cases, the military conduct patrols (Loader and Percy, 2012) and can only use military force if they come under attack (Tsagourias, 2006). When the military is deployed in this way, they must use different methods of soldiering than those they would use while at war. This form of soldiering, Kaldor (2013) suggests, is a form of policing – or is situated between traditional understandings of policing and soldiering. This is perhaps the closest referent we have for the role of the military where personnel work alongside the public police, private companies and the judiciary as a facilitator of order and security. Loader and Percy (2007: 249 cited in Weiss, 2011) consider the US framing of this role as the ‘world policeman’ a metaphor that invites us into this blurring of functions. Yet, while the military is not permitted to use force unless under attack – they are of course still armed.

Trading places
Despite the well-developed literature that accounts for pluralisation and third-party policing, a different type of arrangement is evidenced in the London Olympic Games 2012 example. Scholarly considerations of the ‘blurring’ of policing form and functions, as has been seen above, is ubiquitous in delivering a narrative of a ‘sharing’ of tactics. However, when comparing the public policing role and the role of the majority of military personnel deployed to the London Olympic Games of 2012 a ‘reversal’ of roles is apparent. Issued with handcuffs, Royal Navy and Army police worked alongside police units such as the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Territorial Support Group’ (Qasim, 2012). Also, unarmed military personnel engaged in other security duties such as security checks, bag searches and patrols. They did this on a daily basis alongside around 9000 armed and unarmed public police (Magnay, 2012). By contrast, the military was asked to adopt policing ‘soft-skills’ in their deployment for the winning of the ‘hearts and minds’ of the public while armed police were conceivably on the ‘front-line’ of the ‘war on terror’. In essence, the military represented traditional democratic policing functions while the public police undertook the role force/weaponised deterrent ordinarily assigned to the military. Furthermore, the deployment of the military at the Games was also under a public police chain of command; something which challenges traditional military deployments.

Nothing is known of an unarmed military operating alongside the public police in a context seen at the London Games in 2012. The military deployed on the streets of London in 2012, during peacetime, have no more powers than civilians – they can only make a citizen’s arrest under section 24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The military is bound by military Aid to the Civil Authorities – yet this framework does not speak to those who are unarmed (as we do here) – the fact is that when the military police in this way they have the same powers as private
security providers of citizen arrest. Although as Quasim (2012) rightly noted when on night patrol in London, military personnel were equipped with handcuffs. Many have argued that distinctions between the public and private, and between crime and war are now a fabrication – the lines between them impossible to draw outside of university walls (Evans, 2012b; Loader and Percy, 2012; Murray 2015, Walker 1993). In practice, however, the picture is just as complex – not least when one comes to consider accountability frameworks in which one must be able to redraw these lines. The public police, the military and private security providers all have different leadership structures which manage their conduct in very different ways. That said, globalising processes are increasingly rendering ideas of the inside and outside of security less apparent and absolute.

There is an established principle in the United Kingdom of the military providing assistance to the civilian authorities in some circumstances. Such provision is termed MACA (MOD, 2007). The delivery of such aid is guided by three criteria:

(i) Military aid should always be the last resort. The use of mutual aid, other agencies, and the private sector must otherwise be considered as insufficient or be unsuitable.

(ii) The Civil Authority lacks the capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one.

(iii) The Civil Authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and it lacks readily available resources.

The nature of the aid provided has ranged from the use of Special Forces troops in terrorist incidents to the provision of logistical and engineering support in times of natural disasters such as outbreaks of foot and mouth disease and flooding. The security operation surrounding the 2012 Games in London was an enormous undertaking. In the initial planning phase, the use of military personnel and equipment was factored into the operation. Their use was in a variety of specialist security roles (Ministry of Defence, 2011). However, as the start of the Games approached it became apparent that the security company G4S, who had been contracted to provide venue security across a range of sites, were failing to deliver the required numbers of personnel. An already overstretched public police was unable to fill the gap. This resulted in the deployment of additional troops in a more general, non-specialist security role.

Military guidelines do make reference to supporting the public police in public order operations. The instructions are specific regarding the nature of this aid stating, ‘services may be requested to provide logistic support such as accommodation, stores, transport or catering’ (Ministry of Defence, 2007). The use of military personnel in a direct operational role in the context of a public order/security operation seemed to represent a departure from the accepted form of military support, which is generally protective and/or supportive. The use of military
personnel in a more regulatory or enforcement role akin to a ‘policing’ role raises important questions. There is what has been described as the unthinkable, as the English Revolution suggested, using the military against civilians (Head and Mann, 2013). The addition of military personnel to the Olympic operation, however, was widely welcomed by the public, press and media. They were mostly portrayed as the saviours of the day while the failed security company G4S were consistently vilified. Boykoff (2014) makes sense of this unquestioning mood as a form of ‘celebration capitalism’ which occurs in a ‘state of exception’ and allows for lop-sided public-private partnerships. However, he also warns that such a mood of bonhomie allows ‘plucky politicos and their corporate pals to push policies they wouldn't dream of during normal times’ (Boykoff, 2014).

Regarding command and control, military personnel deployed under MACA, operations remain under the command of their officers and non-commissioned officers. The military attends to their defined task within the overall scope of the operation in question. The responsibility for the overall operation sits with the lead agency - be that the police, local authority or another body. There is a clear legislative framework for the deployment of the military in the form of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the Emergency Powers Act 1964. The legislation merely provides the basis for the use of the military. However, as Head and Mann (2013) observe, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 does provide the power to activate emergency powers which can be wide-ranging and in which the role of the military is ill-defined. The military role is not subject to any particular form of scrutiny or accountability. This raises greater concerns when the nature of deployment is in an enforcement or regulatory role, as in 2012.

The Armed Forces Act 2006, as amended by the Armed Forces Act 2011, regulates the conduct of military personnel. Individuals are also answerable to the criminal and civil law generally. The Armed Forces Acts are designed to regulate conduct in a military setting and to promote order and military efficiency. They contain no specific processes or provisions to hold the particular service or any individuals accountable for the conduct of, and within, operations such as the Olympic security operation.

The Olympic deployment does raise questions about the suitability of military personnel for a civil enforcement role. They are trained for a fundamentally different role and one that does not generally require the ability to deal with the complexities of conflict resolution on an individual level. The questions of reasonable use of force and proportionality are not core considerations in the military context. Military commanders are indeed familiar with the concept of ‘mission creep’ (Rizer, 2015). This refers to the unintended and unplanned widening of involvement in a situation in response to unseen events. Thus personnel become more deeply embroiled in a situation than was originally intended and sometimes beyond their ability to deal with it. This is an ever-present danger in enforcement operations. It remains to be seen if the Olympic deployment represents a one-off event in the nature of the deployment.
However, with questions now being raised about the police firearms capability following recent developments in European countries, debate and the policy trajectory may continue towards a role for the military in law enforcement operations. While fundamental questions were in the main overlooked, specifically around accountability and suitability, the general excitement for the Games meant that these matters were not raised by the public.

Soldiering by consent
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 affords police officers the capacity to use ‘reasonable’ force on behalf of the State. This is directly linked to accountability frameworks in place to ensure that the force used is required in the circumstances – in those events when the force used is disproportionate to the lawful objective, the behaviour of officers may be considered unlawful. Taking the lead for security on British soil is, of course, the responsibility of the public police. The legality of this is underpinned by an ideology of ‘consent’ (Waddington and Wright, 2010). Jackson et al. (2012: 2) note:

Models of crime-control of this sort recognise the importance of the legitimacy of justice institutions and the legal system. Legitimacy is the public belief that institutions have the right to exist, the right to undertake the functions assigned to them, and the right to dictate appropriate behaviour. A legitimate authority has the right to exercise power: it commands consent (a sense of obligation to obey) that is grounded in legality and moral alignment.

Policing requires legitimacy and the consent of the public; in essence, a ‘confidence in justice’ is a necessary objective (ibid). This is most likely to occur when policing practices and behaviours are consistent with public expectations (Rowe, 2002). Consent and legitimacy are jeopardised where the presence of arbitrary force and/or partisanship occurs. Paramilitary policing techniques, as seen for example in the 1970s and 1980s in Northern Ireland, present real challenges to notions of legitimacy and policing by consent (Weitzer, 1985). The legitimacy of policing actions is not solely rooted in reality, rather perceptions (Bradford, Jackson and Hough, 2013) and the presence of normative safeguards which foster integrity are important too. Accountability is closely tied to concepts of ‘policing by consent’. Accountability takes a range of forms; it may be manifest in moral decision-making, embedded in codes of professional conduct and formalised in legal regulation (see Dixon, Coleman and Bottomley, 1990). Frameworks of police accountability in the UK are tripartite in nature between the Home Office, Police Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables. At an operational level, individual police officers are bound by professional standards, the law and expected competencies, with a clear chain of command from constable upwards. However, as Holdaway (1983) suggests matters of police practices and accountability cannot be reduced to such a rudimentary form in an occupation where extremes exist, and where discretion forms a dominant facet
of daily work, the translation of standards from senior ranks to constables may well be less confidently asserted or operationalised.

While analyses on the blurring of policing roles contributed by scholars such as Loader and Percy (2007) illuminate on issues a great deal, what is striking, however, is that the military as an unarmed support for a mixed public and private policing sector remains under-explored. What then of when soldiers police? Should this also be underpinned by a similar ideology of consent? As this unarmed personnel are given stop and search powers, the ‘consent’ of these functions is an important issue to consider. Indeed, matters of accountability are central in considering the vulnerability of the public (having indistinguishable lines of redress/complaint) and of soldiers themselves (lack of rules/systems where individual soldier accountability can be adjudicated on fairly and with representation). In the context of third-party policing, as Mazerolle and Ransley (2005) conceive, new situations, a lack of protocols and a plurality of policing agents raise a multitude of ethical issues.

Clausewitz (1976) suggested that it was the result of irresolvable political crises that demanded the soldiers leave the barracks. Soldiers as such were only meant to appear in times of extreme crises and endangerment. The world’s biggest private security firm [G4S] was supposed to supply more than 10,000 guards for London Olympic venues in accordance with its £284million contract. However, it failed to come through, forcing the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games to call in an additional 4700 troops as backup (Boykoff and Fussey, 2014).

The soldiers who came to play a role in the Games, therefore, stepped into a ‘security gap’ created – not by a civil authority lacking capability – but by a contract delivery shortfall from a private security provider. Their military ‘business’ at that moment was to act as a safety net for a private corporation and an already quasi-police force. This is not so much a blurring of police and military boundaries, but it represents a militarisation of corporate security. This introduces a whole new layer of blurred accountability. If the role of the military is ill-defined at times of civil contingency, it is perhaps more unclear when stepping in for a marketised security contract.

What is also interesting, however, is that the failure of the private sector to deliver on its contract was not problematized regarding the future delivery of criminal justice provision. Evans (2012b) is correct to point out that:

While politicians have taken G4S to task over its contractual failures, the critique of private security provisions, in principle, is absent from the debate… the very nature of sovereignty itself is replaced by a technocratic ensemble of private/public, military/policing, local/global contractors.
To whom are these new private/public/military security partnerships accountable then? G4S are ultimately answerable to market forces, while their personnel are civilians accountable to the civil and criminal law. These dynamics are muddied when soldiers (armed or unarmed) step into the void. As a slight but important aside, do we need to question the very viability of a mixed and competitive market to deliver security in the face of terror threats? If a diverse market of security provision reached such a crisis at the 2012 Olympic Games that the army had to be drafted in, does this arrangement truly constitute security? The mixed markets of security and justice were sold on the premise that they would increase efficiency, transfer risk from the public purse and strengthen local approaches (see for example Fox and Albertson, 2011). When mixed markets fail, however, what emerges is an emergency state situation.

**The metamorphosis of the military mission**

With a blurring of function, roles and responsibilities come a direct challenge to the deeply impressed cultural conditions of the military institution. It is important to bear witness to how alterations, advancements and a reimagining of policing in democratic societies impacts. As Wilson (2008) explains, institutions are not monolithic, nor do they exist in vacuous spaces. The cultural components of an organisation, be that the environment of work, the intended aim of the work, and importantly those involved in delivering the work, are hugely influential in structuring both formal and informal rules, obligations, values and behaviours. The context in which work takes place within, and the overt and more discreet cultural forces that are at work, orientate the social view of work for the occupational body and affect the overall functioning of the collective group.

Separately, the cultural dimensions of police work and military work have been well documented. Broadly speaking, police work has largely been viewed as taking place in an environment where extremes exist. The polarity of experience exists; with activities that are relatively pedestrian in nature (e.g. routine patrols, community liaison) and at the same time, these activities can be abruptly derailed with the confrontation of danger, risk and uncertainty. Arguably, some of the cultural characteristics of institutions of the public police and the military are similar. Both are structured by rank and file hierarchies, and both require their members to confront various risks in the discharge of their duties. Specific scholarly investigations into military cultures offer rich insights such as the processes of dispossession of a civilian role (Hockey, 1986), the requirements and training exacted on new recruits that curb freewill (Mileham, 1998) and, what exactly the military institution requires of its membership (Lande, 2007).

However, and crucially, the mandate of the military is inimitable and the military institution as a whole unique. The mission of the military, as Wilson (2008) details, is entirely different to other institutions as from the outset their primary mission 'entails
a readiness to take life and destroy property’ (p.22). Numerous recent sociological analyses have pointed to the violence-imbued nature of military work and encouragement to resist any explanatory logic of individualism put forward when interpreting violent behaviours of military/ex-military personnel (see Treadwell, 2016). Individual behaviours and actions of the occupational body are wedded to prevailing expectations and cultural context of the institution. As Hockey (1986) postulates, basic army training has two fundamental aims – to teach soldierly skills and to teach new recruits the canons of military discipline.

The mission is a central tenet of military culture. The sense of mission is gained through a mutual coherence and commitment to this. Of course, orders are crucial in defining the mission and the expectations placed on various ranks and individuals; indeed, understanding what the mission is, and what tactics are required to meet the intended aim are fundamental doctrines impressed on each member of the military family respectively (Mileham, 1998). So, in a context such as the London Games in 2012 where the mission or sense of mission is more opaque, blurred or less-than-usual, problems for the military and individual personnel are likely to ensue.

So how then may an unarmed military policing alongside an armed public police be problematised? The answer to this question may well rest in an excavation of the cultural facets of the military institution. As noted above by Wilson (1998), the determining contexts of military work are exceptional based on its antecedents and historical statements of purpose of ‘what a military force is for’. From basic training, military personnel undertake training which is deliberately oriented towards combat competencies. Despite what some military sociologists have suggested is the end of a ‘warrior ethos’ among the military in the face of rapid advancement in military technologies and methodologies (see Coker, 2007), soldiers are fundamentally prepared, from the outset, for engagement in combat roles, trained in weapons systems and schooled in what to do when engaging with ‘the enemy’. This sits in contrast to training in public policing. With its emphasis on community engagement, policing by consent and the considered application of discretion, basic training for the police is completely different. Indeed, those who are trained and later authorised in the public police to deploy lethal force, do so on a voluntary basis, and often later in their public policing career.

Requiring military personnel to engage in an unarmed policing role is contrary to the cultural backcloth from which they emerge. While perhaps it is the case that the military will be trained in police tactics in advance of policing operations, the overarching canons of soldiering instilled through deliberate and sustained socialisation in the military unit may be challenging to suppress or cause conflict in negotiating, in an operational context, what cause of action to take. Military values are deeply impressed, and by way of example, Hockey (2009:481) indicates the significance of military acculturation in saying that ‘infantrymen possess an understanding of how to do the embodied work of their trade’ (author emphasis
added). Already we see that the military does not hold any special powers of arrest beyond those of citizen’s arrest. However, we know that some were equipped with handcuffs and others routinely carrying out policing tasks such as stop and search. Furthermore, established lines of police accountability will fail to apply in such circumstances rendering the public unable to easily access routes of redress and the individual soldier vulnerable to hostile treatment by their superiors or the State.

The state of vulnerability that the unarmed soldier finds themselves within is indicative of their inability to compete on the basis of power relations. In Hockey’s (1986) ethnography of army recruits, he eloquently situates the powerless position of lower ranks. Hockey describes the requirement for lower ranks to follow orders (through the threat of coercive sanctions) and suppress disapproval. Indeed, he reflects how the soldier’s life and existence are fundamentally out of their own control and in the hands of higher ranking personnel. Further, access to information is commensurate to rank and the acting on orders with an impoverished of information/context is standard in Hockey’s (1986) account.

The ‘mission’ that an unarmed military who undertake policing activities engage within is challenging to observe from the outside, and likely difficult to comprehend within. If mission success is predicated on the ‘best’ and ‘correct’ instructions (Mileham, 1998), then while the ‘mission’ may succeed at what cost does this come when considering the precarious position military personnel may find themselves within. Expectations placed on them are to ‘police’. However they are not the public police, nor are they adequately trained or socialised into an institution which is built upon foundations of democratic policing; indeed, quite the opposite. The individualism of the soldier is subordinated to the group identity and the necessity to follow commands, however where commands may lack firm accountability foundations, then it is likely that lower ranks will suffer in the discharge of their metamorphosed mission objective.

Conclusion
This article has attempted to demystify the role of the military in an ever-evolving security landscape. While this must start by, we argue, adding to the sophisticated theoretical debate – what is perhaps more important is to make sense of the military involvement, in its many different forms to a growing concern about the accountability of policing provisions and counter-terror practices. Rather than offer neat answers to the complex and mixed forms of policing that emerged post 9/11 we have aimed to shine a light on some of the nuanced problems of blurring police and military roles, which currently appear to be going unnoticed.

The security of mega-events, domestic counter-terror strategies, the accountability of the police force, the pluralisation of policing and the increasing involvement of the military in domestic security are defining issues of western states in the 21st Century.
Academia is almost flooded with debates that concern all of these matters as scholars work to provide a critical eye on the ever-evolving security environment. Much of this work recognises that all of these problems are inextricably bound - most commonly from the perspective that the ‘war on terror’ connect them all. However, look a little deeper as there are some cautionary tales.

First is that where public, media and political discourse accepts (and celebrates) the necessity of military presence on UK streets. This means that the potentially contradictory cultures, values and ethos (and enforcement ‘policing’ approaches) are not brought into as sharp a focus as we might imagine/expect, nor are accountability structures necessarily readily evident. Second, while the deployment at the Games in 2012 was a response to a resource crisis, it was also a testing of the practical application of soldiers in roles with policing powers. Grey areas of stop and search and using the privileges under the terms and conditions of ticket purchasing to allow soldiers to search bags are abounding. Interestingly, an illusion is created; in light of systemic G4S failures and the shortage of police resources to cover the human capacity needed, the military is called upon to fill spaces but do not fundamentally change the character of ‘policing’ and ‘order’ maintenance strategies. The cautionary tale here though is in the absence of mediators and the lack of clearly drawn systems of authority and leadership (and the cultural acceptance and buy-in of soldiers to these) time needs to be taken to critically appraise the context in which policing is conducted.

This then leaves the third great cautionary tale from the 2012 London Olympic Games, and more generally amidst greater pressures to adequately resource domestic security. If public police, the private sector and military assemblages are to resurrect themselves in the future, then establishing where ownership, control and leadership begin and end is pivotal. If global trends suggest greater shifts to pluralised policing methodologies to reduce crime/terror problems, then inspection into such issues (in addition to matters of justice, rights and the rule of law), must remain at the forefront of planning, implementation and critical review of pluralised policing of all types and the potential and actuality of blurred lines of policing beyond easy distinction.
References


Easton, M., & Moelkers, R. (2007). Current challenges in the process of constabularisation of the armed forces and militarization of the civilian police?.

In International Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (pp. 28-29).


