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Wellsprings of a 'World War': An early English attempt to conquer Canada during King William's war, 1688-97

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Abstract
The military historiography of early modern colonial America currently offers two contrary interpretations. One emphasises the exceptional nature of American warfare as a product of a process of military acculturation between the colonists and the native Americans; the other denies this acculturation in favour of the successful importation of orthodox European forms of warfare. By assessing the military history of the early years of King William's War, 1688-97, including in particular an early attempt to conquer French Canada in 1690 by Sir William Phips, this article contributes to this historiographical debate. King William's War (known on the European continent as the Nine Years' War) has been little studied in this context and the article argues that not only was military acculturation less relevant in the later seventeenth century, but also that the colonists' deployment of amphibious actions against the French demonstrated an increasing recognition that, strategically and militarily, they were required to draw closer to London's war policy and to replicate European combat.

Two months after William, Prince of Orange, and his wife Mary jointly accepted the English throne in Whitehall's Banqueting Hall on 13 February 1689, the new king
notified all colonial governors of his intention to join other European powers in declaring war on France.\textsuperscript{1} Almost immediately, an Order in Council followed which fully embraced a series of recent recommendations from the Lords of Trade and Plantations on the prosecution of the war overseas.\textsuperscript{2} To a large extent, William was by these communications seeking to underline his authority throughout the overseas territories as elsewhere. This was particularly the case with the colonies on the American mainland which had suffered considerable administrative and political disorder since reports reached them of William's landing at Torbay in November 1688 at the head of some 14,000 troops and the subsequent flight of King James VII & II to France.\textsuperscript{3} The events of the Revolution of 1688 had understandably provoked considerable anxiety and uncertain loyalties amongst the governors and colonial officials, who owed their appointments almost exclusively to James. To them, therefore, William was signalling the necessity of settling allegiances.

Concern with bolstering his monarchical authority abroad is not the only interpretation that William's early announcements on the war overseas admits. The Earl of Halifax noted the war's priority for William such that 'it would incline one to think, he took England only in his way' as the principal Protestant champion against Louis XIV's Catholic and absolutist France.\textsuperscript{4} William may well have been immediately seeking to co-opt and embed England's overseas territories within his emerging wartime Grand Strategy. Over half a century ago, G. S. Graham embraced this interpretation by arguing that the Nine Years' War, 1688-97, or King William's War as it was known in the colonies, marked a watershed in the history of warfare on the grounds that it represented the first colonial attempt to 'wage world war' in conjunction with the imperial parent.\textsuperscript{5} Nevertheless, characterising the Nine Years' War as a 'world war' in which the North American colonialists were from the outset
essential participants in the imperial parent's global war strategy was overblown. The recommendations of the Lords of Trade and Plantations for North America, which the king accepted with alacrity in the spring of 1689, were decidedly limited. The Lords had simply proposed that William should settle a number of new governors, who should then, in conjunction with the appropriate colonial institutions and officials, determine how to act against France. Unlike the European theatre in Flanders, where John Evelyn deemed 'the great stress of the quarrel lies', there was for the North American plantations to be no commitment of military resource nor proposals for an increased naval presence.

Graham's view did nonetheless provide a counterpoint to nineteenth-century American histories on the colonial wars such as Francis Parkman's *Half-Century of Conflict*. This work in particular contextualised the colonial conflict during King William's War as part of the historical evolution of the military in North America, and this local interpretation has endured. Modern works by Richard Johnson and Guy Chet readily demonstrate that the North American theatre during King William's War was neither united within the Grand Strategy nor even strategically categorised along with the more prosperous Caribbean islands as part of a single Atlantic empire. Indeed, the history of the early years of war in North America emphasised continuities in the colonial conduct of warfare which were parochial; and even when the colonialists did attend to William's principal strategic objective - namely the wholesale reduction of French power wherever exercised - it was a product of their long-standing search for frontier security rather than an attempt to integrate the conduct of the Anglo-French conflict in the colonies with the war in Europe. Notwithstanding, as Johnson contends, the outbreak of the European war did frame North America as an Anglo-French 'battleground for Atlantic supremacy', and,
despite the continuities in warfare, the early years of the war might be seen to foreshadow changing strategic and military thinking on the conduct of colonial warfare.\textsuperscript{10}

The military historiography of early modern New England embraces two perspectives. An established interpretation identifies the exceptional nature of American military strategy and tactics - which proved successful against the British Army during the Revolutionary War, 1775-83 - as the progeny of the colonial period. Specifically, A. J. Hirsch has argued that in the early-to-mid-seventeenth century warfare underwent a process of acculturation whereby the military habits of the Indians and English colonists first clashed and were then mediated; accordingly both sides were to have gained a clearer understanding of the other's combat culture and practices were altered.\textsuperscript{11} For the colonists, one consequence was the dilution of their symmetrical European tactics with the asymmetry of the Indians' reputed 'skulking way of war'.\textsuperscript{12} The contrary view denies this process of acculturation and instead contends that from the mid-seventeenth century the colonists reaffirmed and entrenched their commitment to European military culture, tactics and strategy.\textsuperscript{13} Guy Chet has reasoned that success for the colonists during the wars of the eighteenth century was a product of an offensive military strategy underpinned by the safeguard of being able to remain successfully on the tactical defensive, with the necessary logistics and lines of communication intact. The argument follows therefore that Britain was not defeated during the Revolutionary War by an exceptional American way of war but rather because London's strategy and tactics failed to adhere to the basic tenets and standards of European warfare.\textsuperscript{14}
Consideration of the military history of the early years of the Nine Years' War in North America, including in particular the very first planned attempt to seize Canada - the bureaucratic and political centre of *La France Septentrionale* (New France) - intrudes into this debate on the evolution of the American military. Despite the continuities in the pattern of the conflict, military acculturation was seemingly less relevant in the later seventeenth century when the English and French colonists were increasingly engaged in direct combat. Certainly the colonists' lamentable operational failures during this period highlighted the inefficacy of the local and largely asymmetrical 'small wars' fought according to Indian tactics. Moreover, the deployment of amphibious operations by the colonists (particularly in the attempt to capture Canada) indicated a recognition of the benefits of a mobile strategic offensive which simultaneously embraced (if properly planned and resourced) the tactical defensive. Indeed, analysis of these early war years should demonstrate the changing strategic and military perceptions on the conduct of colonial warfare which became more closely aligned to, and sought succour from, the imperial parent's Grand Strategy.

In the period immediately prior to the outbreak of the Nine Years' War, the local military realities in North America weighed heavily with both France and England. Although the French settlers in Acadia maintained a quiescent existence with the Wabanaki, Mi'kmaq and Maliseet tribes, Versailles's control of Canada - where the principal communities were situated around Quebec, Montreal and Trois Rivieres - was vigorously disputed by the Five Nation Iroquois Confederacy of the Seneca, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga and Cayugas Indians; the Iroquois were indeed the
principal menace to the French in the late seventeenth century. This particular conflict destroyed the career of one governor-general of New France, Joseph de la Barre, who was recalled by Louis XIV in 1684 for negotiating what the king considered a humiliating peace treaty with the Confederacy, while La Barre's successor, the Marquis de Denonville, saw his position critically undermined by intrigue at the French court and inconsistent policy towards the Indians. Despite being given more men and resources to cow the Iroquois and developing a military strategy to conquer their north-eastern base of New York by attacking overland through Albany from Canada while a six frigate fleet bombarded the coastline from Manhattan to Boston, Denonville was opposed by the minister of marine and scion of the influential Colbert family, Marquis de Seignelay, who forced the governor's plan to be shelved and persuaded Louis in the early months of 1688, as he began to contemplate war on the European continent, to instruct that peace be sought.¹⁵

The English colonists also possessed a full history of conflict with the native Indians. King Philip's War, 1675-78, had been bloodily fought against the Wampanoag in southern New England and the Wabanaki in the north. While the colonists eventually suppressed the former, victory against the latter had not been forthcoming. Initially, the Wabanaki had been reluctant to involve themselves in the southern land sales conflict but, having been goaded into war by the colonists' export to the northern regions of their clumsily conceived and implemented disarmament policy, they rigorously upheld the strategic sovereignty of their territory by expelling the English from the area northeast of Falmouth. In return for recognising Indian sovereignty over certain lands in Maine, the offering of marks of respect and the payment of annual corn quotient, the 1678 Peace Treaty allowed for colonial resettlement. However, throughout the 1680s, tensions flared over the payment of the quotient and
the terms of resettlement which in effect nullified the peace treaty and led to individual colonial settlements seeking bilateral agreements with local Wabanaki tribes. Even then, as the New Hampshire and Maine colonists who in 1685 had concluded a separate peace treaty with the Pennacock, Saco, Androscoggin and Kennebac Wabanaki quickly appreciated, differences could not be reconciled.\textsuperscript{16} Morrison contends that the continuing friction was a product of the lack of an enforcement mechanism within the treaties and, more prosaically, the cultural variance between the two societies.\textsuperscript{17} In this context, even limited military acculturation simply ensued that either side was better placed to wreck havoc on the other's way of life rather than promote a broader cultural appreciation. Certainly, as the depredations upon English settlements by tribal groups were vigorously maintained up to the Revolution of 1688, it would seem that both strategically and militarily the challenge posed by the Wabanaki to the English was credible and could not be readily dismissed.\textsuperscript{18}

On the North American plains these local conflicts with the numerous Amerindian tribes acted as proxy for the wider Anglo-French disputes. Although the European powers had arranged a Treaty of Neutrality in 1686, which included a provision to respect the current territorial boundaries in North America, attacks by, and on, their respective Indian allies increased up to the official outbreak of war in 1689.\textsuperscript{19} European events had outstripped the ratification of Denonville's Treaty with the Iroquois and their historical pro-English stance meant that they knew about William's intent to enter the war before the French governor and sought to take advantage. A raid against the French farmers in the Lachine in the early morning of 5 August 1689, killing and capturing over a hundred, signalled the Iroquois's continuation of their conflict with the French, though increasingly within the context of the Anglo-French
conflict. Similarly, English settlers complained of continuing French attacks by proxy. Pemaquid, a northern outpost on the Maine coast weakened by the aftershocks of the Revolution of 1688 in Boston, was lost to the Wabanaki in August 1689, while in the same month a series of raids destroyed 30 families in Piscataqua.

Upon receipt of their official declarations of war, the European colonists on both sides continued to conduct the conflict through their allies amongst the indigenous peoples; but increasingly this parochial aspect of the war came to represent direct settler engagement and therefore the process of military acculturation became less relevant for the colonists on both sides. This subtle change in the prosecution of the war was largely a product of the arrival in North America in the autumn of Comte de Frontenac as a replacement for the ailing Governor Denonville. A scion of the Perigord noblesse d'épée, Frontenac held a senior French military office as a marechal-de-camp and had previously served as governor-general of New France from 1672 to 1681. Returning now for a second term in charge, he intended to implement - albeit in a modified form - Denonville's previously drafted plan for the capture of New York and the suppression of Iroquois mischief. Frontenac's expeditionary force had however been delayed by strong Atlantic headwinds following its departure from La Rochelle in August and, when it arrived off Quebec in early October 1689, it was too late in the season to mount the attack. Although denied this opportunity to undertake a potentially decisive single thrust against New York, and thinking (in the event wrongly) that the Iroquois might respond to peace overtures, Frontenac appreciated that propitious prospects existed to make territorial gains along the northern frontier of the English territories, where the changes among office-holders and uncertainty attendant upon the 1688 Revolution had weakened
security. In addition, the French Canadian settlers were also now making clear to the governor their enthusiasm for retaliatory strikes against their English counterparts.\textsuperscript{23}

In order to make full use of these circumstances, Frontenac devised a three-pronged raiding strategy against the English northern frontier. Two groups were to proceed south: one from Montreal was to strike at the Albany fur-trading centre, whilst the second was to move from the settlement at Trois Rivieres and conduct opportunist attacks east of the Merrimack River. The third group was allotted an operational area south of the Androscogin River with the settlements on the Maine coast as their objective. Although the first raiding group changed their target, this trident of attacks bore fruit. In a similarly disordered condition as Pemaquid had been, Schenectady in New York was effectively razed by the French colonists in conjunction with their Indian allies. Successful assaults at Salmon Falls situated on the tributary of the Piscataqua along the Maine coast and upon Forts Loyal and Casco soon followed. By such actions, the French were effectively attacking the line of defensive fortifications that Governor Sir Edmund Andros had built up in the late 1680s to guard the exposed frontiers of the then newly established Dominion and Territory of New England, which comprised the mutually incorporated colonies of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Plymouth and Rhode Island, from the attacks by the native Indians.\textsuperscript{24}

As Frontenac's raids gathered pace, the leaders of the component colonies of the Dominion of New England, which aside from Maine and Plymouth had had their independent status restored following the Revolution, began to talk of a response with its foundation being security through unity. The Massachusetts governor, Simon Bradstreet, wrote to the temporary insurgent governor of New York, Jacob Leisler, of
the need for 'an Uniting and combining as one to withstand and Oppose the common Enemy', which prompted Leisler to call for a conference to plan a campaign of action. These developments signalled the colonists' intent to decrease their reliance on the Five Nation and other Amerindians for the furtherance of the war and, instead, for themselves to assume greater responsibility for the operational planning and execution of attacks against the French. There is no sense at this stage, however, that the colonists were seeking a role within William's wider Grand Strategy for the Nine Years' War. Governor Bradstreet did suggest an attack on Canada, but his operational purpose was not to check Louis XIV's global power by reducing New France but rather to plug the porous frontier security. Equally, when in response to Bradstreet's leadership of opposition to the French raids, the Massachusetts Council accelerated a pre-existing plan to assault Port Royal, the principal French Acadian settlement, the key motivation was to diminish French privateering capability against the local trading ventures. French potential to prosecute a vigorous guerre de course within inshore waters had been clearly demonstrated as early as October 1688 when L'Ambuscade and Le Fourgon (then based at Port Royal) had captured an English brigantine and six ketches trading between Port Royal and Canseau; and the French privateers' continued, and menacing, presence in these waters provoked a grave concern among English merchants for the security of their trade routes. There was also, however, a more general desire to avenge the French backed raids on the settlements in 1690 and, in particular, to damage the activities of the Acadian trader Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin who had close links to the Wabanaki through his marriage to the local chief's daughter.
In January 1690 a group of prominent Massachusetts merchants led by John Nelson had first tried to put together an expeditionary force to attack those harbours and settlements which provided shelter to the French privateers.\textsuperscript{30} Their principal target was Port Royal which, due to the scale of the succour it provided, had gained a reputation as the 'Dunkirk of America'.\textsuperscript{31} In return for the loan of the colony's two sloops and a portion of public funding, the merchants offered the General Court and Representatives of Massachusetts a share of the plunder and future trade resulting from a successful action against the French. Although the General Court initially proved reluctant to give this project the go-ahead, a start was made in taking up public subscriptions.\textsuperscript{32} Raising monies, however, proved slow during the first months of 1690; and with the impact of Frontenac's raids being felt along with the continued loss of trade and fellow colonists' call for action, the Massachusetts leaders put aside any lingering doubts about the operation and pushed preparations forward by committing public money and by determining that two men out of every six be pressed to raise of a force of 500. Although requests were sent to London for supplies, particularly of powder and shot, the continuing preparations and the operation's timescale suggest that Massachusetts did not expect a positive reply. Consequently, when the land troops were embarked aboard a frigate, two sloops and three ketches in April none of the vessels had been provided by the Royal Navy and the provision of war supplies had been entirely local.\textsuperscript{33}

The General Court's assumption of control of the operation's organisation discounted Nelson's previously prominent role and it meant that he was passed over for the command of the expedition, with the former provost-marshall general of the Dominion
of New England, Sir William Phips, gaining the appointment. An inveterate adventurer, Phips had made his money and reputation from humble beginnings as a ship's carpenter's apprentice through successful treasure hunting in the Caribbean Sea, and a judicious marriage to a widow of a Boston merchant. Though coarse and often unscrupulous, he had a talent for self-promotion which caused him originally to offer his services to this expedition. A self-taught sailor who lacked military experience, Phips nonetheless possessed an attitude of mind attuned to the task. This quality did not, however, compensate for the absence of specialised military understanding and his appointment throws into sharp relief the rather amateurish and provincial nature of the colonists' first wholesale engagement in King William's War. This point was only partially undermined by the progress of the operation.34

Ten days before setting sail on 28 April, Phips received signed instructions from the governor and Council of Massachusetts. These orders focused upon the destruction of Port Royal which was to be achieved either through the offer of terms to the garrison or, if these were refused, though reduction by assault. Further, and perhaps in deference to the mercantile interest reflected in the General Court's original order of 4 January, Phips was directed to continue along the Acadian coast to destroy other French possessions which might be used to harbour privateers.35 Overall, the instructions' favoured coastal strikes to undermine French prosecution of the guerre de course in local waters. There was also, however, an implicit recognition that any successful action by Phips would serve to weaken the French hold on Canada just as Bradstreet's original suggestion for attack on this French territory to stabilise frontier security was gaining an operational form following an inter-colonial conference meeting in late April.36
On anchoring in Port Royal harbour 12 days after his departure from Nantasket, Phips waited a day before sending out a flag of truce on 10 May. The French commander, Governor Louis-Alexandre des Friches de Meneval, had already been apprised of the English approach by his forward guard. Supported by a garrison of less than 100 men to operate 18 cannon without emplacements, after a signal to the inhabitants had raised a paltry three volunteers out of at least 95 families totalling 197 adults, Meneval took the understandable decision to seek the best terms possible. In this he was successful, for it had been Phips's intention that the garrison surrender at his discretion; and on 12 May he went ashore with some troops to plunder and despoil the local chapels.37

After the operation Phips boasted that he had reduced the whole of Acadia in three weeks; in reality he encountered very little Acadian opposition.38 Ignoring the chronological framework of his instructions, Sir William undertook a number of amphibious coastal raids prior to approaching Port Royal. Just two days after his departure, he anchored at Mount Desert Island and despatched an officer to reconnoitre Penobscot Fort and, although the report made clear that only some native Indians remained, Phips determined to attack. On two occasions bad weather prevented the assault from going ahead and it was only on 4 May, when one of his ships engaged the fort prior to the land assault to reveal that all the inhabitants had fled, that the attack was cancelled. On the following day, once joined by the Salem and Ipswich companies, Phips again reordered his instructions' targeting priorities by an attack on the Passarequadie French plantation at the entrance to the Bay of Fundy. The six men wounded during this attack highlighted the ease with which men and resources could be wasted before coming upon the main target. Phips might well have argued that the loss of six men was a small price to pay, given the territory
reduced, but the lack of opposition at Port Royal prevented a genuine test of the impact of these initial raids upon his force.

"Piddling" is how D. E. Leach described the ultimate strategic worth of an operation which even failed to cover its cost through the plunder that Phips landed upon return to Boston on 30 May. Leach recognised, however, that this description was based upon inflated expectations which contemporaries - except perhaps Phips - never possessed. Aside from intimidating the Wabanaki, the expedition to Port Royal and the assaults on the Acadian coast were envisaged as a limited operation to reduce French privateering capability in local waters; a link to the grander strategic ambition in respect of North America (the reduction of Canada) had been implied but not formalised. Judged in the provincial context, both in respect of its composition and command and also its objectives, Phips's operation had proved modestly successful; but it was neither representative of a substantive strategic offensive nor did it possess the potential (due principally to a lack of resources) to adhere to the orthodox defensive tactics redolent of European warfare in general.

It has already been noted that success in the raids against French Acadia had been implicitly linked to the more ambitious project - originally proposed by Bradstreet - to reduce Canada. During the progress of the Acadian operation, the inter-colonial conference comprising representatives from New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Plymouth had largely presumed upon its success and had formulated a plan which focused upon the capture of Quebec and Montreal. Historians have customarily referred to the plan as 'two-pronged', but caution is required for this implies a military as well as a strategic equivalence and thus conflates two quite different forms of warfare. One attack was to be a 150-mile thrust by troops through
the North American interior from Albany to strike at Montreal. The second was to be a seaborne assault upon Quebec: the fleet carrying a body of troops would navigate from Boston by the western shores of Anticosti Island and then haul south-west up the St Lawrence River, seeking an appropriate landing point for the soldiers from which an attack could be launched. In outline, therefore, this second operation demanded an internal combination between land and sea forces. The only military link between the two attacks was their common ability to act as a diversion for each other. By submitting the two towns to simultaneous assaults, it was anticipated that the French forces would be fatally divided and thus permit the capture of at least one town upon which the two forces could link and secure Canada.42

The point has subsequently been well made that this plan encapsulated the approach which became the standard pattern for successive English attempts to conquer Canada; but on this first occasion London played no part.43 It was not that the ministry was unaware of the colonists' intent to attack Canada, or that it failed to appreciate the strategic prize being offered by the capture of the territory.44 However, the troubled Irish theatre was currently demanding a disproportionate amount of the government's military and naval resource as William opposed the Jacobite attempt to claim the island as a staging post for James VII & II's return to his mainland kingdoms. In any event, any military capacity which might be released from a quiescent Ireland was to be dedicated to the war on the European continent; and William's commitment to this deployment of resources was evident from his decision to delay his appearance at the head of the allied army in Holland and instead to cross the Irish Sea to take charge of the campaign on the island from 1690 in the hope of effecting a speedy resolution.45 These circumstances meant that, despite the support of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, the colonists' procurement request for
frigates, troops and various other war supplies were not addressed by the ministry; and, although there remained a faint hope within the colonies that some war supplies at least would arrive for the operation (which, ironically, they did, but not until the following year), the colonists ultimately had to accept that London was content for the war in the colonies to be broadened as a function of frontier defence. This local motivation for an attack on Canada was convenient for the ministry, not only on the grounds that it resonated with the allied Grand Strategy, but also because it provided the self-serving argument that the colonists should bear the operational burden wholesale.

In the short term a meeting of the colonists on 1 May simultaneously signalled their acceptance of England's inertia and their own administrative and procurement responsibilities for the attempted conquest of Canada. The material demands of the overland attack were less because it was to be undertaken in conjunction with between 1,500 and 1,800 Five Nation Indians. The provinces represented at the conference therefore agreed that they would have to supply only a total of 885 men for the interior force with proportionate arms and ammunition. Complaints soon followed, however, that some provinces had failed to provide their quotas and it became clear that the total fixed upon would remain a paper figure. There was also much wrangling over the appointment of a commander for the overland attack. Relations between the colonies became strained because New York believed that it had been forced to accept Boston's and Connecticut's candidate, Major-General Fitzjohn Winthrop, and the rancour could only have had a negative impact upon the cohesion of the force. Meanwhile, Massachusetts principally laboured with the logistical and bureaucratic problems inherent in trying to fit out the operation directed against Quebec. Although it has been suggested that New York sent two ships as a
contribution, they did not subsequently take part in the expedition; and thus the fleet of 32 ships with up to four months provisions aboard that eventually proceeded up the St Lawrence was provided for by private subscription. As for the troops, the Massachusetts House of Deputies enacted legislation to encourage volunteers by the offer of pay plus the division of a half of all plunder.\textsuperscript{49} This financial inducement, in conjunction with the more physical means of impressment, produced a force of up to 2,500 men\textsuperscript{50} whose commander was Lieutenant-General John Walley. He was to answer to Sir William Phips, who had on his return from Port Royal been appointed the operational commander-in-chief.

Fitzjohn Winthrop began his overland march to Montreal on 1 August with a force of only 500 militiamen and a prevailing confusion as to how many, if any, native Indians were to join him. Only around 70 Iroquois did, less than four per cent of the maximum number expected, with the rest decimated by the smallpox that had also affected Winthrop's force. Moreover, it soon became apparent that his problems would not just be confined to personnel. On reaching Wood Creek it was found that there were too few canoes for the troops to proceed on the next stage of the journey north across Lake Champlain, and it was too late in the year for birch bark to prove effective building material. As these delays were encountered, supplies also began to diminish. Albany had from the outset been opposed to Leisler's governorship, and New York believed Winthrop to have been imposed upon them, thus the political circumstances were not propitious for a resolution of these logistical and manpower problems. A week passed as the force was held up at Wood Creek and on 15 August a council of war decided that the original plan was no longer viable. Using such canoes as were available, Winthrop despatched a force under John Schuyler on a series of opportunistic raids around Montreal, while the main force retreated to
Albany. It arrived on 20 August to a political storm and a personal confrontation between Winthrop and Leisler over the failure of the expedition which resulted in the former's temporary imprisonment. Meanwhile, Schuyler proved himself not more than a nuisance to the French by raiding La Prairie near Montreal. This act, far from proving diversionary, doubtless only advertised the colonists' weakness to the French and allowed Governor Frontenac to switch men and resources to the previously poorly supplied Quebec as Phips made his approach.

According to an observer at Montreal, it was Frontenac's ability to reinforce Quebec which proved the determinate factor in the failure of the English operation. Lahontan thought that if the descent had been made within two days before or after Frontenac's arrival in the walled town, then Phips and Walley would have been successful. With this, Phips's chaplain, Reverend John Wise, wholeheartedly agreed. The debilitating loss of time can be explained by a concatenation of circumstances. First, waiting forlornly for supplies from England, Phips's fleet did not leave Boston till 9 August and then the three divisions - the admiral's squadron commanded by Captain Gregory Sugars in the Six Friends, the vice-admiral's squadron commanded by Captain Thomas Gilbert in the Swan, and the rear-admiral's squadron commanded by Captain Joseph Eldridge in the American Merchant - made a leisurely pace, capturing some French privateers en route, to reach the mouth of the St Lawrence by mid-September. More time was lost as the fleet proceeded up the river in bad weather without the necessary pilots. Consequently, it was 5 October before the fleet hauled to as it reached the Île d'Orléans, coming to anchor on an ebb tide in the roadstead between that island, the south and north shore of the St Lawrence and Quebec town.
Convention dictated that a summons should be sent first to the governor of the targeted town. On 6 October this was conveyed ashore by Captain-Lieutenant Savage, and in reply Frontenac rejected the offer in what Phips considered a 'revilling answer'. Accordingly, the council of war (composed of the ships' captains and the senior soldiers and chaired by Phips) resolved to land the soldiers on a beach - the Beauport Shore - approximately two miles below Quebec town. The soldiers were then to advance towards Quebec with the aim of making camp on the bank of the St Charles River which lay between them and the town. The intention was that before this river be crossed, Phips would send up the St Charles a number of small vessels containing the necessary ordnance, ammunition and victuals. This allowed the troops to be largely unburdened at their landing, carrying only two biscuits and a minimal amount of ammunition. The plan's dénouement directed that four vessels from Phips's fleet bombard the town to soften up its defences prior to the land assault and, as a diversionary tactic, a number of other vessels were to proceed beyond the town in the hope of convincing the enemy that a second army was to be landed. If the main force was successful in making the river crossing, and Phips spied them on the hill to the east above Quebec where they were to launch their attack, then he would land a smaller body of 200 men under the cover of the fleet's guns in an attempt to breach the town's walls.

Such operational plans, particularly when they involve the co-ordination of land and sea forces, are typically reliant upon internal sequencing. In this instance, however, the plan was overly dependent upon the seamless transition of each stage. Once ashore the land force's tactical mobility, and also defence, was entirely dependent upon the navy establishing an interior line of communication. If boats with the necessary war stores and provisions were not dispatched to the St Charles, then the
soldiers would be able neither to make the river crossing nor to advance. Equally, even if the interior line was established, then the naval bombardment and the thrust down the hill would have to be precisely timed to ensure that each had its maximum effect; notably there was little latitude with which to absorb any chronological slippage. As the New Englanders contemplated their position off the north shore of the St Lawrence River at the beginning of October, facing a resolute defensive force entrenched in a fortified town that was naturally sited upon a cliff, such planning prescriptions might, with some justification, have been considered foolhardy. Certainly the circumstances which unfolded on the first day of the operation were not propitious for its success.

A landing was first attempted on 7 October only for it to fail as the ships' boats and the other small vessels in which the soldiers were embarked were tossed back from the shore by the heavy surf brought on by the bad weather. Embarrassingly, the only boat that made progress - a captured French barque containing Captain Ephraim in command of 60 troops - ran aground on the north shore on a half-ebb; and, as the tide fell further, it could not float off. With the vessel's vulnerability clear to the French, Phips had to bring some naval ordnance to bear in order to safeguard the barque while a flood tide was awaited.\textsuperscript{57} Dawn on 8 October heralded better weather and a successful landing was completed, though with the flats lying some distance off, the men were forced to wade through water that was between knee and waist deep. Various estimates put the number of effective men landed as between 1,200 to 1,400\textsuperscript{58} - a considerable reduction from the number embarked due to an outbreak of smallpox during the outward voyage - and Lieutenant-General Walley immediately ordered four companies to be drawn out from this number as 'forlons' for the advance towards the uplands. These formations fulfilled their purpose as they drew
the attention of a sharp fire from the enemy who had upwards of 800 men variously posted on either wing, behind bushes to the left and amongst a small village beyond a creek on the right. A general charge forced a short French retreat, though they almost immediately gained security from the swamp and shrub. This provided them with the necessary cover from which to snipe effectively at the New Englanders as they continued, exhausted from the wade ashore and the intensity of the immediate firefight, to make heavy going of the march to the St Charles. By nightfall, with the two biscuits long since consumed and ammunition low, though only suffering casualties of less than ten killed and 60 wounded, they came to within half a mile of the river and made camp in the expectation that by daylight Phips would have delivered the essential logistical support.59

It was at this stage in the operation that the plan's sequencing began to mistime. By midnight only six eight-pound field guns had been delivered and were almost immediately rendered useless by being landed on marshy ground. A request for victuals and ammunition yielded, by daylight on 9 October, only half a barrel of powder. Then, in a move contrary to the plan's order, Phips brought four vessels about to bombard the town before the soldiers had captured the hilltop or even crossed the St Charles. Both the anonymous pamphleteers and Mather commended Phips's action as brave and necessary. Both emphasised that, despite his own vessel sustaining much damage from the town's 24-pounders over the course of an engagement lasting several hours, only three men were lost, and that in bringing the ships down alongside the town, he had a legitimate expectation that the soldiers would be advancing from the east. In this respect, Wise was particularly censorious of Walley's leadership, arguing that he was consumed by an 'Invincible Arrest of fear',60 and that his command from the landing had suffered many errors of
judgement, not the least of which was to hold up the advance. Understandably, the majority of the soldiers on land held no such views. They believed that Phips had transgressed the council of war's resolutions in the full knowledge that he provided neither for the army's tactical mobility nor its ability to sit on the defensive. Furthermore, the bombardment had expended vast quantities of powder and shot without benefit to the army. Indeed, these circumstances, combined with Phips's and the other naval captains' seeming indifference to the troops' cold and hunger, meant that the soldiers felt increasingly alienated from the operation's purpose.61

Prior to the bombardment, Lieutenant-General Walley had received detailed intelligence from some French prisoners which had made the likelihood of the operation's success seem increasingly dim. It was reported that since the arrival of Frontenac from Montreal, Quebec had been reinforced at least twice and that there were approximately 3,000 soldiers in the town, a figure which did not include the several hundred situated on the other side of the St Charles who had opposed Walley's landing. Walley judged that the lack of provision was beginning to tell upon the men and that, although he sent out reconnaissance parties with orders to hunt and gather whatever was available, the French had hastily removed all beasts from the immediate area. With no sign of the small vessels from the fleet bearing provisions, he called a council of war of land officers on 9 October to review the situation. The lack of provisions and war materials and the fact that the troops faced a force three times their number weighed heavily with the council. These circumstances were compounded by the prevalent distemper which, with only one surgeon on hand, was daily decreasing the ranks. The land council therefore decided that Walley should inform Phips of the situation and suggest that the troops embark for a period of rest and refreshment.62 The accounts written from Phips's
perspective claim instead that he took the decision to re-embark the troops on his return from the bombardment after realising that their current position was not the most suitable from which to assault the town.\textsuperscript{63} Regardless as to which view had prevailed, the decision advertised that the second attempt against Quebec had failed and the commanders had to organise the tricky process of bringing the troops off the shore.

Walley had to arrange this embarkation in the knowledge that its successful execution would require a secure rear-guard movement. Upon reaching the beach on 10 October, however, he was informed of various skirmishes which had produced casualties and collapsed the morale amongst officers and men. Walley was forced to show resolve at the embarkation point by sending the first of the boats away when the security of his rear-guard was threatened by hundreds of troops moving in a disorderly manner on to the beach in order to board them. Nonetheless, having determined that he would embark the troops on 11 October, Walley intelligently sought to reinforce the guard by detaching three columns to drive back the enemy and ordering his officers to draw off half a regiment each till all the men were aboard their ships. The embarkation was completed the following day though not without (as Walley himself admitted) some disorder, which doubtless contributed to five field guns being abandoned.\textsuperscript{64}

Prior to undertaking a second landing of the troops (and a third attempt against Quebec), the council of war met on 13 October to review the force's capacity. This meeting also offered an opportunity to reconsider the landing disposition, thereby addressing Wise's criticism that the original beachhead had been too far removed from Quebec; it might also have discussed Phips's alternative plan to reduce the
town to starvation by taking possession of the Ile d'Orleans, but inexplicably the council was adjourned without resolution. The council's resumption was intended on the following day after a full survey of all victuals and war supplies but bad weather then interposed to prevent its meeting. A storm blew up which drove the ships from their anchors and scattered the fleet beyond the Ile d'Orleans. Operations against Quebec had been terminated. Well might Mather ascribe the failure to the 'Hand of Heaven'.

The majority of the fleet returned to Boston on 19 November, though the journey home was not without incident. Aside from four missing vessels, up to three were wrecked en route and the forces who made port were decimated by smallpox: one estimate put the first ship home as having lost over 50 per cent of her men to the disease. The soldiers' circumstances, in particular, only worsened when they reached harbour. The colonial leaders had again presumed upon success and plunder to fund the expedition and thus there was no hard cash with which to pay the soldiers' wages. As a result, credit, in the form of paper bills, was introduced into the empire for the first time; and, although this provided the soldiers with some means of subsistence, it was discounted by the pernicious effects of variable exchange rates of as low as 12 to 14 shillings to the pound.

III

Various reasons have been suggested for the colonists' retreat from Quebec in 1690. Chief among them is Winthrop's failure to attack Montreal and thus co-ordinate the necessary diversion for Phips's force on its approach to Quebec. Critically, Montreal's security allowed Governor Frontenac to augment and entrench Quebec's physical and human defences in anticipation of the English landings. As a result,
some scholars have emphasised the French governor's command, arguing that throughout the week when Phips sought to engage the town with his land and sea forces, Frontenac organised a judicious defence which preserved Quebec without suffering heavy losses. Such tactical caution has also attracted its critics. They maintain that Frontenac passed up a propitious early opportunity, when Walley's troops were foundering on the Beauport Shore, to attack and devastate the English expeditionary force. Undoubtedly a notable victory might have been achieved by such an action but Frontenac rightly identified the risk he would have to bear as prohibitive. No military benefit could have accrued from having the burden of his men, rather than the enemy, disordered by crossing the St Charles River to reach the shore line. Moreover, by virtue of the mobility offered by Phips's naval force, the New Englander held the operation's tactical (not strategic, as Eccles contends) trump card. Frontenac could not be sure that the Beauport landings represented the principal land assault and he risked Phips undertaking another substantive landing further up the St Lawrence while the majority of the French troops were cut off on the Beauport Shore by the St Charles's tidal pattern. In this respect, Frontenac's preservation of his superior defensive force inside Quebec allowed him to dictate the progress of the operation by forcing Phips's men to make the difficult approach to the town. With a foretaste of the resolute and potentially bloody defence of the town which the French would mount being offered to Walley's troops as they began their march to the St Charles, Frontenac's tactics were rewarded by the English decision to give up the operation on the basis that they had neither the capability nor the resources to succeed.

Although the two reasons for Phips's failure to reduce Canada - the absence of the Montreal diversion and Frontenac's assured organisation of Quebec's defence - can
readily be found within the history of the operation, there is a third more general and systematic explanation which is far less persuasive. This interpretation focuses upon the form of warfare adopted for the attack, namely a combined land and sea operation, with the critics claiming that in the late seventeenth century this type of warfare was usually rendered ineffective due to disagreements between the land and sea commands, which were made worse by the vagaries of communication between the two. It is also contended that ultimately amphibious attacks could succeed only if the enemy’s coastal defences were weak or if the attacking force possessed a secure and functioning supply line. Such operations have as a result been dismissed as possessing little military or diplomatic currency.72

The blame attached to the operational form in this instance does, however, represent a sweeping and rather hurried appreciation of the combined operations undertaken by England during the Nine Years' War; these arguably proved far more successful than the critics of Phips's operation allow. Army-navy actions at Londonderry in 1689 and again at Cork and Kinsale in 1690 provided important footholds to allow William to secure both the north and south of Ireland, thereby squeezing out the Jacobite challenge from its central position defending the line of the Shannon. Within continental Europe, combined operations against northern French ports and towns on the eastern Spanish coast (principally at Palamós) led to the English fleet wintering in the Mediterranean for the first time in 1694-95 and, more generally, contributed to the successful implementation of William's maritime strategy to establish England as a preponderant Mediterranean power. There was also some success, albeit limited, for combined arms in the Caribbean: Commodore Lawrence Wright's expeditionary force reclaimed St Kitts and the Dutch island of St Eustatius in 1690 while temporarily holding Mariegalante in the following year; and in 1695
Commodore Wilmot and Lieutenant-General Lillingston, despite a fractious relationship, expelled the French from northern Hispaniola. It is also notable that in 1697 Captain John Norris and Colonel John Gibson organised their combined forces to defend St John's, Newfoundland, from further French encroachment. Of course these successes cannot hide the fact that the majority of the nine combined operations undertaken throughout the war failed; they do, however, sufficiently undermine the claim that the operational form of this type of warfare was fundamentally flawed and ill-conceived by London.

During the Nine Years' War, therefore, amphibious warfare was increasingly deployed as a handmaiden to both the maritime and continental strategies variously pursued by William and his ministries. Overall, as the above examples evince, its mobile adaptability combined with the tactical defensive base offered by a integral and coherent operational deployment lent itself to its use as a diversionary tactic against the coastline of continental Europe, temporarily drawing enemy troops from the main theatre of operations and thereby raising the spectre of a second front, albeit one modest in size; while overseas, a combined army-naval force might provide the strategic platform for the capture of enemy territory, particularly islands.

In North America, it was not therefore the generic form of warfare which was at fault but rather that Sir William Phips's combined operation was forged by the colonists out of a local pattern of warfare based upon frontier defence which obscurely reflected, but was not integrated within, London's Grand Strategy. Consequently, and with further grievous implications for the operation, the colonists received no material help from England and they had to bear wholesale the provisioning of the men and equipment. In addition to the tactical failures during the course of the operation, such as the absence of a diversion at Montreal and the mistiming of the plan's internal
sequencing, and Frontenac's shrewdly stolid defence, it was clear that the operational capability should be viewed as limited and poorly comprised from the outset.

The point was further underscored by the events immediately following the return of Phips's depleted squadron to Boston. With the colonies, and Massachusetts in particular, struggling with the financial consequences of the operation which they had had to fund and which had failed to pay for itself, Sir William quickly left for London in order to lobby for another operation against Canada. His swift departure and subsequent representations indicated that the colonists now fully realised that Canada could not be conquered by an amphibious action comprised as a function of frontier defence; instead, England would have to provide a substantial and sustained commitment. Phips's proposal of June 1691 called for such a material contribution from England: a third-rate vessel and a preponderant artillery capability, including 100 cannon with a ten-fold proportion of powder barrels, was considered a minimum. London's silence in response to this scheme caused Phips rashly to dilute his requirements in a second proposal he set before the Lords of Trade in the autumn: the number of cannon required was now unexpressed, while the mortar procurement was cut by half and the proportion of powder was reduced by some 800 barrels. Even with these reductions neither the king nor the Lords of Trade and Plantations were prepared to afford Phips a second opportunity - albeit this time with some material contribution from England - to attempt the reduction of New France. Indeed, the only subsequent attempt against Canada during the war which London did promote was as the latter half of a West Indian expedition in 1693. However, the maladministration in the planning of the expedition, combined with the ravages of the
sickness throughout the expeditionary force when in the Caribbean, meant that no credible assault against Quebec could have been or was attempted.\textsuperscript{76}

Labouring under straitened financial circumstances, and without more substantial material and strategic commitment from England, for the remaining period of hostilities between England and France the North American colonists could only promote a parochial defensive war of frontier skirmish which was both reliant upon, and to a lesser degree directed against, the Indians. This represented a continuation of the local pattern of warfare which had been established prior to the outbreak of war and which continued, though with a subtle shift to emphasise the responsibility and participation of the colonists on either side, following the official declarations of war in 1689. The 1690 attack on Quebec had emerged from this pattern and offered an insight to the importance of capturing Canada from France, along with an operational blueprint which might in future be adopted by London and a recognition that the colonists could not successfully undertake the operation as a function of their internal security. In this respect the process of military acculturation between native and colonist was less relevant, as the latter demonstrated a preference for an amphibious form of warfare which through increased deployment was attaining orthodox status in England. The operations of 1690 prompted the colonists' dawning realisation that strategic military success in colonial warfare might be obtained only by integration within London's Grand Strategy; above all else this assimilation might allow them to avail themselves fully of the resources required for the adopted methods of European warfare. The early conduct of King William's War in the North American territories had foreshadowed the necessity for the colonists' limited national military experience to give way to participation in a world war.
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Notes

1. 'Circular Letters to the [Governors of the Colonies]', 15 April 1689, The National Archives of the UK (hereafter, TNA), Colonial Office (hereafter, CO) 324/5, 39.

2. 'Journal of the Committee for Trade and Plantations', 26 April 1689, CO 391/6, 208-11; 'Order upon a Report from the Committee Touching the state of the Plantations with Relation to the War with France', 2 May 1689, CO 1/5, 4-5.

3. Dunn, 'The Glorious Revolution and America', 455-57; Steele, 'Communicating the English Revolution to the Colonies', 333-35.


5. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic, 68.


14. Ibid., 144-47.


21. 'A Short Account of the loss of Pemiquid Fort in New England', 3 Aug. 1689, CO 5/855, 75-76; 'An Abstract of divers Letters write since July Last by Merchants in


27. Bradstreet to Shrewsbury, 29 March 1690, CO 5/855, 181-82.


35. 'Instructions for S’ William Phipps Kn¹ Commander in chiefe of all Navall and Military Forces, provided and appointed for their Majestyes service against the Common Enemy French and Indians in an Expidition unto Novo Scotia and L’accadie’, *DHSM*, V, 81-83.


41. See, for example, Leach, *Arms for Empire*, 92; and Steele, *Warpaths*, 141. Interestingly, Dunn, *Puritans and Yankees*, 290, refers to a 'three-pronged attack' with the third prong being a feint in Maine. Except for Haffenden, *New England*, 90 n.4, this is not addressed in the other secondary sources, nor is it referred to in the primary sources consulted.


43. R. Harding, 'The Expedition to Quebec', 197-212.

44. Bradstreet to Shrewsbury, 29 March 1690, CO 8/855, 181-82; 'The Humble Advice of Sir Rob'. Robinson Touching the Reducing of Placentia Bay, Seizing


47. 'Articles Agreed upon by the Commissioners of New York and New England Colonies', 1 May 1690, CO 5/1081, 292; Leisler &c. to Shrewsbury, 23 June 1690, ibid., 330; Van Cortland to Sir Edmund Andros, 19 May 1690, *NYCD*, III, 717.


50. There is no consensus amongst the main primary sources for this expedition on the exact number of troops embarked. Wise, 'The Narrative of Mr John Wise', 5,
stated that there were 2,500 soldiers; while 'A Short Account of Sir Wiliam Phips's Expedition into Accady and that upon Quebeck in Canada', n.d., CO 5/905, 267, put the total at 200 less. Savage, *An Account of the Late Action of the New Englanders*, 3, stated that the number was 2,000, as does Anon, 'Sir', 28. Walley, 'Mr Walley's Journal', 554-65; and Mather, *Pietas in Patriam*, made no estimate as to the total number of troops embarked. Walley, 'Mr Walley's Journal', 577, does note though that some 1,200-1,300 men were drawn up on the Beauport Shore, but this most likely refers to the total number of men landed rather than the total embarked at Boston.


52. 'Journal of Major General Winthrop's March from Albany to Wood Creek, 1690', *NYCD*, IV, 196; Frontenac to the Minister, 12 Nov. 1690, *NYCD*, IX, 459.

54. Wise, 'The Narrative of Mr John Wise', 5-8; Anon, 'Sir', 29-35; Mather, *Pietas in Patriam*, 34.

55. 'A Short Account of Sir William Phips's Expedition into Accady and that upon Quebec in Canada', n.d., CO 5/905, 268.

56. Walley, 'Mr Walley's Journal', 555.

57. Ibid., 556; Wise, 'The Narrative of Mr John Wise', 9-10; Anon, 'Sir', 36-37.

58. Savage, *An Account of the Late Action of the New Englanders*, 3, estimated 1,200; while Walley, 'Mr Walley's Journal', 557, reckoned the number was between 1,200 and 1,300. Both Mather, *Pietas in Patriam*, 38; and Anon, 'Sir', 38, approximated 1,400. Interestingly, the three principal French sources, 'An Account of what occurred in Canada on the descent of the English at Quebec, in the month of October, 1690', Frontenac to the Minister, 'De Monseignat's Narrative of the most remarkable Occurrences in Canada. 1689, 1690', *NYCD*, IX, 457, 459, 487, put the number of troops ashore at the considerably higher figure of 2,000.

60. Wise, 'The Narrative of Mr John Wise', 12.


63. Mather, *Pietas in Patriam*, 4-5; Anon, 'Sir', 38-9. Interestingly, despite its evident prejudice in favour of Phips, Wise, 'The Narrative of Mr John Wise', 13, agreed with Walley\'s account insofar as it was decided that Walley would go with Wise aboard Phips\'s ship to discuss matters.


70. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 44; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 75.


75. 'Memorial of Sir William Phips of what is to be done for the Expedition against Canada', 21 Sept. 1691, CO 5/856, 316.

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